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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF
ALL FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION: AN ANALYSIS OF
ARTICLE 4’S IMPLEMENTATION ON HATE SPEECH IN THE
UNITED STATES, JAPAN, AND GERMANY
ABSTRACT
In 2017, white supremacists gathered in Charlottesville, Virginia to protest
the removal of Confederate General Robert E. Lee’s statue from a public park.
The “protesters” chose to voice their concerns by carrying tiki torches and
spewing racist chants. The encounter began with hateful speech and ended in
bloodshed and death. This is one example of how the United States, along with
several other democracies, has been confronted with the question of how far
they should go in limiting extreme forms of hateful, discriminatory expression.
In various countries around the world, hate speech, at its worst, has resulted
in political extremism and targeted violence. But the way these countries have
responded to hate speech has varied vastly with different democracies having
conflicting views on how hate speech should be regulated. Different definitions,
standards, and regulations exist in various countries to constitute how a given
country would classify “hate speech.” This results in different responses to these
differing interpretations of hate speech. Freedom of speech, however, is almost
always regarded as a fundamental individual right in most democratic
constitutional systems. It is a right that international human rights law obliges
states to guarantee, respect, and enforce.
This Note focuses on three countries and their response to hate speech: The
United States, Japan, and Germany. It will discuss how hate speech is defined
in these countries, and what regulations—or lack thereof—have resulted.
Additionally, this Note will focus on one of the international human rights
treaties, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (“ICERD”). Article 4 of ICERD requires states both to
implement hate speech laws for purposes of furthering the right to equality, and
to respect and enforce freedom of expression. This Note will discuss how ICERD
can be implemented in areas where hate speech legislation has failed.
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INTRODUCTION
In New York City, one of the most prized and beautiful places in Manhattan
is Columbia University. At one of the entrances, many tourists and students are
aware of an “iconic piece” that usually resides there: the man who stands at the
gate with signs that say, “Google it! Jews control . . .” 1 “Some of his signs have
said ‘Google it! Jews control the internet,’ ‘Google it! Jews control Congress,’
‘Google it! Jews control Wall Street,’ ‘Google it! Jews control Hollywood,’
‘Google it! Jews control Obama,’ and ‘Google it! Jews financed black
slavery.’” 2 While Columbia students—one-third of whom are Jewish—have
managed to make a joke of the man, the reality is that this man’s signs and
rhetoric, whether direct or indirect, may have an influence on people’s
consciousness and promote anti-Semitism. 3 This story is a small example of how
protected free speech can be emotionally, socially, and psychologically
damaging to certain demographics.
Throughout the world, and particularly in the United States, there has been
a false dichotomy created between free speech and hate speech. 4 “Should society
value dignity, or should society value liberty? Should we allow any type of hate
speech, even if it may cause psychological harm or an increase in violence and
racist thought, or should we counteract hate speech with more speech?” 5 These
types of questions are being asked by United States scholars, but this presents
the reader with a false choice. Liberty, First Amendment rights, and freedom of
speech can be valued while upholding societal structures and laws implemented

1. Deborah Levine, Sticks and Stones May Break My Bones, But Words May Also Hurt Me:
A Comparison of United States and German Hate Speech Laws, 41 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1293,
1294 (2018).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 1294–95.
4. The term “hate speech” will be used throughout this article, yet the term remains largely
undefined by any one authority. Therefore, for the purposes of this paper, when the term hate speech
is used, the reader can assume this definition from the United Nations Strategy and Plan of Action
on Hate Speech is being used:
There is no international legal definition of hate speech, and the characterization of what is
‘hateful’ is controversial and disputed…. the term hate speech is understood as any kind of
communication in speech, writing or [behavior], that attacks or uses pejorative or
discriminatory language with reference to a person or a group on the basis of who they are,
in other words, based on their religion, ethnicity, nationality, race, [color], descent, gender
or other identity factor. This is often rooted in, and generates intolerance and hatred and, in
certain contexts, can be demeaning and divisive.
United Nations Strategy and Plan of Action on Hate Speech, UNITED NATIONS (May 2019),
https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/UN%20Strategy%20and%20Plan%20of%
20Action%20on%20Hate%20Speech%2018%20June%20SYNOPSIS.pdf [https://perma.cc/3JQH
-VNXM].
5. Levine, supra note 1, at 1295 (emphasis added).
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to protect vulnerable communities from the psychological harm and violence
associated with hate speech.
In 2017, white supremacists gathered in Charlottesville, Virginia to protest
the removal of Confederate General Robert E. Lee’s statue from a public park. 6
The “protesters” chose to voice their concerns by carrying tiki torches and
spewing racist chants. 7 The encounter began with hateful speech and ended in
bloodshed and death. 8 The issue of hate speech has confronted several
democracies with the question of how far they should go in limiting extreme
forms of hateful, discriminatory expression. 9 The words “hate” and “speech”
joined together lead reasonable people to imagine what could fall under that
category. While the most common assumptions would surely be included
(including but not limited to racist, homophobic, or sexist speech), different
definitions, standards, and regulations exist in various countries for what a given
country would classify as “hate speech.” This results in different responses to
these differing interpretations of hate speech. In various countries around the
world, hate speech, at its worst, has resulted in political extremism and targeted
violence. But the way these countries have responded to hate speech has varied
vastly with different democracies having conflicting views on how hate speech
should be regulated. Freedom of speech, however, is almost always regarded as
a fundamental individual right in most democratic constitutional systems. It is a
right that international human rights law obliges states to guarantee, respect, and
enforce. 10
This Note will focus on three countries and their response to hate speech:
The United States, Japan, and Germany. It will discuss how hate speech is
defined in these countries, and what regulations—or lack thereof—have
resulted. Part I of this Note will focus on one of the international human rights
treaties, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (“ICERD”). Article 4 of ICERD—unlike the U.S. Supreme
Court’s approach and interpretation of the U.S. Constitution’s First
Amendment—has a specific provision for hate speech that “condemn[s] all
propaganda and all organizations which are based on ideas or theories of
superiority of one race or group of persons . . . or which attempt to justify or

6. Debbie Lord, What Happened at Charlottesville: Looking Back on the Rally that Ended in
Death, ATLANTA NEWS NOW (Aug. 13, 2019), https://www.ajc.com/news/national/what-happened
-charlottesville-looking-back-the-anniversary-the-deadly-rally/fPpnLrbAtbxSwNI9BEy93K/
[https://perma.cc/AUJ9-29CC].
7. Id.
8. See id.
9. Craig Martin, Symposium: Hate Speech Laws in Japan Striking the Right Balance: Hate
Speech Laws in Japan, the United States, and Canada, 45 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 455, 455 (2018).
10. Id. at 456.
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promote racial hatred and discrimination in any form . . .” 11 Unlike the First
Amendment, this part of the treaty quite explicitly requires states both to
implement hate speech laws for purposes of furthering the right to equality, and
to respect and enforce freedom of expression. 12
This Note will also explore the similarities and differences between how
hate speech is regulated and ICERD is implemented in the United States, Japan,
and Germany. Part II of this Note focuses on the First Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution, analyzing what lies at the foundation of the primacy of free speech
in the United States. For example, one point of regular debate in the United
States is whether there is a free speech breaking point, or “a line at which the
hateful or harmful or controversial nature of speech should cause it to lose
constitutional protection under the First Amendment.” 13 Surveys have
traditionally shown that American people generally have strong support for free
speech, but that number decreases when the poll focuses on particular forms of
controversial speech. 14 Despite the fact that there is in fact a disdain among
Americans for controversial, hateful speech, the Constitution has yet to be
amended or interpreted to reflect this sentiment. This is because regulating hate
speech is viewed as a threat to the important American value of free speech. 15 If
the harm of hate speech is taken seriously, it must be accepted that it poses a
threat to democratic values, even undermining constitutional rights. 16 But to
suppress hate speech similarly risks causing significant harm to constitutional
rights and democratic principles. 17 This poses a challenge for constitutional
democracies throughout the world, and the United States offers a particularly
poignant example.
Part III of this Note will analyze questions similar to those posed in Part II
with Japan as the focus. It will begin by looking at the history of free speech in
Japan and how some of the attitudes towards free speech today have formed over
time. Next, a turning point for Japan will be discussed—when it became
apparent that Japan was in need of more hate speech regulation. Finally, the last
piece on Japan will focus on instances within case law in which ICERD has been
implemented.

11. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, art. 4,
Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 [hereinafter ICERD].
12. Martin, supra note 9, at 457.
13. Stephen J. Wermiel, The Ongoing Challenge to Define Free Speech, AM. BAR ASS’N,
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/crsj/publications/human_rights_magazine_home/the-on
going-challenge-to-define-free-speech/the-ongoing-challenge-to-define-free-speech/ [https://per
ma.cc/6SK5-CNHM].
14. Id.
15. See Martin, supra note 9, at 456.
16. Id.
17. Id.
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Part IV of this Note discusses Germany in a similar context. First,
Germany’s general relationship with free speech and its constitutional free
speech laws are discussed. Next, Germany’s well-known history with the
Holocaust and World War II are discussed as the primary reasons behind
Germany’s posture towards free speech and hate speech. Germany’s laws reflect
the high value that German society places on preventing its horrific history from
repeating itself. Finally, a case is discussed that tries to implement ICERD, and
while Germany’s laws on hate speech have been highly effective, the case
highlights a few problems with ICERD’s implementation in the midst of
Germany’s very specific laws.
I. INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
The development of ICERD evidences international awareness of problems
surrounding hate speech and racial discrimination. The United Nations, along
with several countries around the world, have recognized that racial
discrimination has become a global problem, and it is often linked to speech
discriminating against racial minorities.
A.

The History and Origins of ICERD

ICERD was adopted on December 21, 1965. 18 The United Nations (“UN”)
General Assembly adopted it in plenary with 106 votes to none, and it was the
first international human rights treaty targeting racial discrimination. 19 From its
inception, the UN had a stated goal of promoting and encouraging respect for
human rights for all without distinction to race. 20
The adoption of ICERD stands as a moment in international legal history
that established the protection of general human rights and fundamental
freedoms for racial, national, and ethnic minorities. 21 ICERD stemmed from
decades of frustration with mostly Western powers and the affront to humanity
represented by apartheid, a system that purported to divide and rank human
beings on the basis of their race. 22 This practice relegated some populations to
the status of “racial inferiors,” while simultaneously elevating the status of
Europeans. 23 Apartheid and related practices were built upon centuries of racial
theorizing, which heightened the perceived, and accurate, need for a treaty like

18. ICERD, supra note 11.
19. DAVID KEANE & ANNAPURNA WAUGHRAY, FIFTY YEARS OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION: A LIVING
INSTRUMENT, 1 (2017).
20. Id. at 2.
21. Id. at xiv.
22. Id.
23. Id.
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ICERD. 24 Thus, while nineteenth-century international law imbibed the racist
virus, the twentieth century attempted to find an escape through fundamental,
principled statements affirming equality, the dignity of human beings, and the
worth of various cultures in humanity. 25
The Convention carried the hopes and aspirations of many in the
international community for an international order of mutual respect among
nations and people. 26 But the document generated mixed emotions. 27 At the
culmination of the drafting process, it was regarded as everything from merely
an infant step in the progress of humanity to a triumph of diplomacy. 28
B.

ICERD’s Prohibitions on Hate Speech

ICERD contains twenty-five articles, and Article 4 specifically addresses
hate speech. Article 4 states in relevant part:
States Parties condemn all propaganda and all organizations which are based on
ideas or theories of superiority of one race or group of persons of one [color] or
ethnic origin, or which attempt to justify or promote racial hatred and
discrimination in any form, and undertake to adopt immediate and positive
measures designed to eradicate all incitement to, or acts of, such discrimination
and, to this end, with due regard to the principles embodied in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and the rights expressly set forth in article 5 of this
Convention, inter alia:
(a) Shall declare an offence punishable by law all dissemination of ideas
based on racial superiority or hatred, incitement to racial discrimination, as
well as all acts of violence or incitement to such acts against any race or
group of persons of another [color] or ethnic origin, and also the provision
of any assistance to racist activities, including the financing thereof;
(b) Shall declare illegal and prohibit organizations, and also organized and
all other propaganda activities, which promote and incite racial
discrimination, and shall recognize participation in such organizations or
activities as an offence punishable by law;
(c) Shall not permit public authorities or public institutions, national or
local, to promote or incite racial discrimination. 29

The Convention does not directly use the words “hate speech,” but the italicized
words above emphasize the places the drafters intended to regulate racially
motivated hate speech. Some commentators have confirmed this assertion,
including the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

KEANE & WAUGHRAY, supra note 19, at xiv.
Id.
Id. at xv.
Id.
Id.
ICERD, supra note 11 (emphasis added).
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themselves in their 2013 General Recommendation. 30 This was General
Recommendation No. 35 and titled “Combatting racist hate speech.” 31 The
discussion took place on August 28, 2012, and focused on understanding the
causes and consequences of racist hate speech and how the resources of ICERD
could be mobilized to combat it. 32 Paragraph 5 directly addresses Article 4 of
ICERD and hate speech, stating that “[t]he drafters of the Convention were
acutely aware of the contribution of speech to creating a climate of racial hatred
and discrimination, and reflected at length on the dangers it posed.” 33 It goes on
to say that “[w]hile the term hate speech is not explicitly used in the Convention,
this lack of explicit reference has not impeded the Committee from identifying
and naming hate speech phenomena and exploring the relationship between
speech practices and the standards of the Convention.” 34
Thus, ICERD imposes an obligation on state parties to prohibit hate speech
more explicitly than some countries actually do, as the treaty expresses an
implied value within the Convention to mitigate and protect against the damage
caused by racially motivated hate speech. ICERD does not contemplate the
prohibition of hate speech as compromising free speech in the same way
countries like the United States do, which has theoretically had benefits when it
comes to implementation. But while effective implementation is the obvious
goal of any treaty, there have been obstacles implementing ICERD due to the
absence of, or problems with, domestic laws.
II. THE UNITED STATES
The First Amendment of the Constitution provides: “Congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of
grievances.” 35
The United States has unfortunately been a leading country in the
perpetuation of racial discrimination through hate speech. The Supreme Court’s
interpretation of the Constitution regarding hate speech has left racial minorities
in America feeling unprotected. 36

30. U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, General Recommendation No.
35: Combating Racist Hate Speech, 26 Sept. 2013, CERD/C/GC/35, https://www.refworld.org
/docid/53f457db4.html [https://perma.cc/3S96-UV8M].
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
36. See R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
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The United States ratified ICERD in 1994, and thus was bound by all the
provisions of the treaty at that time. 37 Regarding the U.S. Constitution and
speech laws, on one hand, some Americans believe hate speech, like all other
forms of speech, should be a guarantee “protected by the First Amendment,
compris[ing] what we refer to as freedom of expression.” 38 The U.S. Supreme
Court describes this freedom as “the matrix, the indispensable condition of
nearly every other form of freedom.” 39 Some Americans believe “without [this
freedom], other fundamental rights, like the right to vote, would wither and
die.” 40 On the other hand, a point of regular debate has been whether there is a
free speech breaking point. 41 The question commonly posed in these debates is
whether there is a line at which the hateful, harmful, controversial nature of
speech should cause it to lose constitutional protection under the First
Amendment. 42
While there is not currently a category of speech known as “hate speech”
that can be uniformly prohibited or punished, 43 certain types of hate speech that
have the purpose and effect of fostering hatred against groups defined by race,
ethnicity, religion, gender or sexual orientation are causing significant harm. 44
Members of such groups suffer direct emotional and psychological harm due to
the speech itself, but also in the form of increased levels of discrimination as a
consequence of the hatred fomented in society by such speech. 45 This type of
harm going unchecked does significant harm to the broader constitutional
system, by undermining democratic systems of equality and inclusiveness, and
ironically by undermining the freedom of expression itself as the members of
target groups are cowed into silence. 46 Despite these problems with hate speech
and the damage it causes to certain Americans, there are some individuals and
groups that still advocate for the protection of free speech—even free speech
that is damaging in this sense. 47
37. Where the United States Stands on 10 International Human Rights Treaties, CIVIL AND
HUMAN RIGHTS NEWS (Dec. 10, 2013), https://civilrights.org/edfund/resource/where-the-unitedstates-stands-on-10-international-human-rights-treaties/ [https://perma.cc/PT7U-YYT5].
38. Freedom of Expression, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/other/freedom-expression
[https://perma.cc/X973-CAGV].
39. Palko v. State of Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937), overruled by Benton v. Maryland,
395 U.S. 784 (1969).
40. Freedom of Expression, supra note 38.
41. Wermiel, supra note 13.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Martin, supra note 9, at 455.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 455–456.
47. See Freedom of Expression, supra note 38 (noting the ACLU’s controversial defense of
free speech rights of groups that spew hate such as the Ku Klux Klan and the Nazis. “…if only
popular ideas were protected, we wouldn’t need a First Amendment . . . If we do not come to the
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Intentions of the Framers

The freedoms proposed in the First Amendment are, quite literally, the first
time the Constitution of the United States was amended. The fact that
amendments to the Constitution were beginning to take place suggests that the
issues being addressed were of importance to the Framers. Observing what has
now become the primacy of the First Amendment prompts the question of what
the Framers’ intentions were when it was first implemented.
The First Amendment was a reaction against the suppression of speech and
the press that existed in English society. 48 Until 1694, there was an elaborate
system of licensing in England, making no publication permissible without a
government-granted license. 49 Thus, it is widely accepted that the First
Amendment was meant, at least in part, to abolish prior restraints on
publication. 50
Speech in England was also restricted by the law of seditious libel that made
criticizing the government a crime. 51 The English Court announced that the king
was above public criticism and that, as a result, statements critical of the
government were forbidden. 52 In 1704, Chief Justice Holt explained the
perceived need for the prohibition of seditious libel: “If people should not be
called to account for possessing the people with an ill opinion of the government,
no government can subsist. For it is very necessary for all governments that the
people should have a good opinion of it.” 53 Professor Erwin Chemerinsky
proposed that “[t]ruth was not a defense to the crime because the goal was to
prevent and punish all criticism of the government.” 54 Professor Zechariah
Chaffee added, “[t]he [F]irst [A]mendment was . . . intended to wipe out the
common law of sedition, and make further prosecutions for criticism of the
government, without any incitement to law breaking, forever impossible in the
United States of America.” 55
Thus, there is little doubt that the First Amendment was meant to prohibit
the licensing of publication that existed in England and to forbid punishment for
seditious libel. 56 Beyond this, there is little indication of what the framers
defense of free speech rights of the most unpopular among us, even if their views are antithetical
to the very freedom the First Amendment stands for, then no one’s liberty will be secure”).
48. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1235 (5th ed. 2017).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 48, at 1235; THOMAS HOWELL, A COLLECTION OF STATE
TRIALS 1095, 1128 (1812).
54. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 48, at 1236.
55. ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN WAR TIMES, S. Doc. No 95, at 12 (1st Sess.
1919).
56. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 48, at 1236.
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intended. 57 Nothing in the historical record sheds light on most of the free speech
issues that society and the courts in the early twenty-first century currently
face. 58
B.

Before the Primacy of the First Amendment

Despite the difficultly of ascertaining all intentions of the framers, the power
and primacy of the First Amendment in United States courts and culture cannot
be denied. “The First Amendment is first, not simply because it falls at the
beginning of a list of amendments, but because it articulates the first freedom
and the nature of that freedom.” 59 Most Americans believe that the First
Amendment’s protections “guarantee[] the freedom essential to humans as
rational beings.” 60 In Palko v. State of Connecticut, Justice Cardozo wrote that
the freedom of thought and speech “is the matrix, the indispensable condition,
of nearly every other form of freedom. With rare aberrations a pervasive
recognition of that truth can be traced in our history, political and legal.” 61
In early, post-World War I Supreme Court decisions, there was a
surprisingly pervasive judicial hostility to free speech. 62 Schenck v. United
States, for example, followed this theory, while also being one of the first places
the primacy of the First Amendment was acknowledged by the Supreme Court. 63
While the United States was at war, defendants Charles T. Schenck and
Elizabeth Baer printed and circulated leaflets to men who had been called and
accepted for military service, urging them not to submit to the draft and military
service. 64 Defendants argued that the First Amendment forbids Congress from
making any law abridging the freedom of speech, or of press. 65 The Court
rejected this argument. In holding that the speech was not protected, the Court
stated, “[t]he question in every case is whether the words used are used in such
circumstances and are of such a nature to create a clear and present danger that
they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent.” 66
While this case established a piece of the First Amendment that Congress was
allowed to regulate, the Court also acknowledged the First Amendment’s

57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Dr. Owen Anderson, Why the First Amendment is ‘First in Importance’, THE WASH.
TIMES (Dec. 12, 2016), https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/dec/12/why-the-firstamendment-is-first-in-importance/ [https://perma.cc/5MR6-TBQC].
60. Id.
61. 302 U.S. 319, 326–327 (1937).
62. David M. Rabban, The Emergence of Modern First Amendment Doctrine, 50 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1205, 1207–1208 (1983).
63. 39 S. Ct. 247 (1919).
64. Id. at 248.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 249 (emphasis added).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2021]

THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION

955

primacy by saying, “[w]e admit that in many places and in ordinary times the
defendants in saying all that was said . . . would have been within their
constitutional rights.” 67 This theme of acknowledging the importance of First
Amendment rights, while regulating it through doctrines like the Clear and
Present Danger test, continued in several other cases decided by Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes. 68
A variety of historical, intellectual, and personal factors, however, led
Holmes to express more libertarian values. 69 In Abrams v. United States, Holmes
revealed “the extent to which he had become more sensitive to [F]irst
[A]mendment concerns in the eight months following his opinions for a
unanimous Court in Schenck, Frohwerk, and Debs.” 70 Similar to the Schenck
Defendants, the Abrams Defendants were charged with conspiracy by printing,
writing, and distributing many copies of a leaflet or circular conspiring against
the United States government at a time of war. 71 While the majority sounded
very much like Holmes in Schenck, Holmes appeared to have a different view in
his Abrams dissent, stating:
[T]he principle of the right to free speech is always the same. It is only the
present danger of immediate evil or an intent to bring it about that warrants
Congress in setting a limit to the expression of opinion where private rights are
not concerned. Congress certainly cannot forbid all effort to change the mind of
the country. Now nobody can suppose that the surreptitious publishing of a silly
leaflet by an unknown man, without more, would present any immediate danger
that its opinions would hinder the success of the government arms or have any
appreciable tendency to do so. 72

While the facts of Abrams were similar to Schenck, Holmes expressed views that
indicated his views on First Amendment protections were shifting. Holmes’
changing views were representative of how free speech evolved into a
fundamental, primary right for all Americans.
C. The Primacy of the First Amendment as a Fundamental Human Right
There is voluminous literature debating why freedom of speech should be
considered a fundamental right. 73 While there is not a single, universally
accepted theory of the First Amendment, there are different views as to why
freedom of speech should be regarded as a fundamental right. 74 There are four
67. Id.
68. See Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 206 (1919); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S.
211, 215 (1919).
69. Rabban, supra note 62, at 1211.
70. Id.
71. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 617 (1919).
72. Id. at 628.
73. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 48, at 1238.
74. Id.
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major theories under which this argument is made: that freedom of speech is
protected to further self-governance, to aid the discovery of truth via the
marketplace of ideas, to promote autonomy, and to foster tolerance. 75
The first reason for the First Amendment’s primacy is self-governance,
which promotes that freedom of speech is crucial in a democracy. 76 Candidates
must be openly discussed for voters to make informed selections in elections,
people can influence their government’s choice of policies through speech, and
public officials are held accountable through criticisms that pave the way, if
necessary, for their replacement. 77 Professor Vincent Blasi argued that freedom
of speech serves as an essential “checking value” on government, checks the
abuse of power by public officials, and that, through speech, voters retain “a veto
power to be employed when the decisions of officials pass certain bounds.” 78
Another classic argument for protecting freedom of speech’s primacy is that
it is essential for the discovery of truth. 79 In his Abrams dissent, Justice Holmes
further expressed his shifting values regarding the importance of the freedom of
speech. He invoked the powerful metaphor of the marketplace of ideas writing
that “the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their
wishes safely can be carried out.” 80 In other words, the argument is that truth is
most likely to emerge from the clash of ideas. 81 John Stuart Mill supported this
view when he wrote that:
[T]he peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is, that it is robbing
the human race; posterity as well as the existing generation; those who dissent
from the opinion, still more than those who hold it. If the opinion is right, they
are deprived of the opportunity of exchanging error for truth: if wrong, they lose,
what is almost as great a benefit, the clearer perception and livelier impression
of truth, produced by its collision with error. 82

He added that an opinion may be true and may be wrongly suppressed by those
in power, or a view may be false and people are informed by its refutation. 83
Finally, Justice Brandeis embraced this same view when he stated that the
“fitting remedy for evil counsels is good ones” and that “[i]f there be time to
expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the
processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 3 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J.
523, 542 (1977).
79. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 48, at 1239.
80. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919).
81. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 48, at 1239.
82. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 19 (1859).
83. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 48, at 1239 (emphasis added).
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silence.” 84 Brandeis’s theory can be found in the values of other countries, yet
the concept of applying more speech in the face of demonstrably harmful speech
has been controversial in the context of hate speech.
A third major rationale for protecting the primacy of free speech as a
fundamental right—which is possibly the most well-known—is that it is an
essential aspect of personhood and autonomy. 85 For example, Professor C.
Edwin Baker said that:
[T]o engage voluntarily in a speech act is to engage in self-definition of
expression. A Vietnam war protestor may explain that when she chants ‘Stop
This War Now’ at a demonstration, she does so without any expectation that her
speech will affect continuance of the war . . . [R]ather, she participates and
chants in order to define herself publicly in opposition to the war. This war
protestor provides a dramatic illustration of the importance of this selfexpressive use of speech, independent of any effective communication to others,
for self-fulfillment or self-realization. 86

This rationale—more than the others—captures the United States’ value of
protecting speech because its crucial aspects of autonomy and expression are
intrinsically important. 87 In his Procunier v. Martinez concurrence, Justice
Thurgood Marshall gave perspective to the importance of free speech to the
human race, stating that “[t]he First Amendment serves not only the needs of the
polity but also those of the human spirit—a spirit that demands selfexpression.” 88
One final common rationale for the primacy of freedom of speech that has
received substantial attention in recent years is that it is integral to tolerance,
which should be a basic value in our society. 89 Professor Chemerinsky cites the
views of Professor Lee Bollinger, a primary advocate of this view. Bollinger
argued that, “while free speech theory has traditionally focused on the value of
the activity protected (speech), [an alternative approach] seeks a justification by
looking at the disvalue of the [frequently intolerant] response to that activity
. . .” 90 He goes on to say, “[the free speech principle] involves a special act of
carving out one area of social interaction for extra-ordinary self-restraint, the
purpose of which is to develop and demonstrate a social capacity to control

84. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375, 377 (1927) (emphasis added).
85. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 48, at 1241.
86. C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV.
964, 994 (1978).
87. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 48, at 1241.
88. 416 U.S. 396, 427 (1974) (Marshall, J., concurring), overruled by Thornburgh v. Abbott,
490 U.S. 401 (1989).
89. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 48, at 1241–42.
90. Id. at 1242; LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND
EXTREMIST SPEECH IN AMERICA 9 (1986).
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feelings evoked by a host of social encounters.” 91 Thus, the free speech principle
is concerned with helping shape “the intellectual character of the society.” 92 The
claim is that tolerance is an essential value, that protecting unpopular or
distasteful speech itself is an act of tolerance, and such tolerance serves as a
model that encourages more tolerance throughout society. 93 This is relevant to
the tensions that exist between the protection of free speech and the harm caused
by hate speech protected by the First Amendment.
All four of these rationales provide a helpful foundation for understanding
why free speech is held dearly in the United States and is protected at almost all
costs. While this reasoning exists, there are several scholars and individuals who
have simultaneously criticized each of these rationales for the way in which they
ignore, undermine, or simply harm groups that do not inherently find their values
protected by these rationales. While each rationale highlights some of the great
freedoms experienced by free speech in the United States, conversely, each
rationale also includes less than ideal consequences faced by individuals
residing in the United States that experience the backlash of the First
Amendment’s staunch protection of almost all forms of speech. 94 Hate speech
falls into the category of being protected speech while harming certain
demographics, particularly racial minorities.
III. JAPAN
While Japan and the United States bear stark cultural differences, Japan has
been likened to the United States regarding freedom of speech laws. Like the
United States, Japan’s Constitution protects freedom of expression while also
limiting it in some circumstances. The value of free speech has grown over time
in Japan, resulting in Japan facing similar challenges to the U.S. These
challenges include an increase in damaging, hateful speech toward minorities
that ends up being protected by the law. The increasing population of minority
and “non-Japanese” people in Japan—and their experience of racial
discrimination—presents the question of the effectiveness of a treaty like
ICERD, which was created specifically for this type of national dilemma.
A.

Free Speech in Japan

The Constitution of Japan guarantees freedom of assembly, speech, the
press, and “all other forms of expression.” 95 Regarding public matters, freedom
91. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 48, at 1242; BOLLINGER, supra note 90, at 10.
92. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 48, at 1242; BOLLINGER, supra note 90, at 120.
93. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 48, at 1242.
94. There are, however, forms of speech that are unprotected and less protected under the First
Amendment. See id. at xxvii-xxx.
95. NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ], art. 21, para. 1 (Japan). This constitution does in fact say
“all other forms of expression” are protected. Id.
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of expression is “a particularly important constitutional right in a democratic
nation” according to the Supreme Court of Japan. 96 Similar to the United States,
Japan’s Supreme Court has also expressed that, while constitutionally protected,
freedom of expression has limits and may be restricted. 97 The Supreme Court of
Japan states in dicta that “freedom of expression under Article 21, paragraph (1)
of the Constitution is not guaranteed without restriction but it may be restricted
for the sake of public welfare to a reasonable and unavoidable necessary
extent.” 98 It goes on to say:
Whether or not a restriction on a particular type of freedom is acceptable within
such extent should be determined by comparing various factors including the
degree of necessity to restrict the freedom, the content and nature of the freedom
to be restricted, and the manner and the level of the specific restriction imposed
on the freedom. 99

While Japan’s Supreme Court has laid a similar foundation to the U.S. Supreme
Court regarding limitations and restrictions on certain types of speech, 100 some
Japanese activists have taken the view that “America needs to get on the same
page as Japan” and “outlaw hate speech.” 101 These comments appear to be
motivated by the “seemingly unstoppable rise of white supremacist, Neo-Nazi
groups in the United States on [former] President Donald Trump’s watch.” 102
Those with this viewpoint believe that in this type of atmosphere, “there is no
guarantee that freedom of speech will maintain a marketplace of ideas in which
enlightenment wins out over hate.” 103 Right now, the opposite is happening in
the United States, causing Japanese activists and commentators to urge the
United States to “follow Japan and Western European countries by passing laws
outlawing hate speech.” 104 But has Japan—as it claims it has—successfully
outlawed hate speech?
As a comparative example, the United Kingdom’s hate speech laws “set
criminal penalties, including fines and imprisonment, for anyone convicted of
using abusive, threatening and insulting words and behavior intended to stir up
96. Sayuri Umeda, Limits on Freedom of Expression: Japan, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS (June
2019) https://www.loc.gov/law/help/freedom-expression/japan.php#_ftn4 [https://perma.cc/5L
CW-YU2D] (citing Sup. Ct., June 11, 1986, 1981 (O) 609, 40 Minshu 872, https://perma.cc/6YEGR8T3).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 48, at xxvii–xxx (listing the several types of speech that
are either less protected or completely unprotected).
101. Shaun O’Dwyer, Japan Doesn’t Need to Criminalize Hate Speech, THE JAPAN TIMES
(Sept. 20, 2017), https://www.japantimes.co.jp/community/2017/09/20/voices/japan-doesnt-needcriminalize-hate-speech/#.Xk3bvhdKigR [https://perma.cc/5JTD-KQTC].
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
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hatred on the grounds of religion, race or sexual orientation, or which otherwise
cause alarm, harassment or distress.” 105 People have been convicted under these
laws, signaling that the United Kingdom has not simply put forth suggestions,
but it will also follow through to convict with consequences in the face of the
inappropriate exhibition of hate speech. 106 A commonsense understanding of the
law would lead one to conclude that the UK establishing these laws illustrates
their proactivity in outlawing hate speech through providing specific convictions
when these laws are violated.
“Japan’s hate speech legislation has no such penalties,” and its laws do not
support the punishment of hate speech. 107 For example, in 2016 there were
“domestic and international protests . . . hate-filled demonstrations and online
abuse directed against Japan’s ethnic Korean . . . minorit[ies] by ultra-right-wing
organizations.” 108 In response, Japan’s law called for “efforts to eliminate unfair
discriminatory speech and behavior . . . against persons originating from outside
Japan and their descendants.” 109 Yet these efforts, “including coordination
between local and national governments to conduct public awareness and
education campaigns to eliminate it,” are nothing more than “vaguely worded
‘measures’ to eliminate hate speech.” 110 Concrete laws and consequences are
necessary to address the problem.
While Japanese scholars, leaders, and activists seemingly desire to be on the
opposite side of white supremacist history, unfortunately their laws have not
been implemented in a way that reflects this desire. Additionally, while ICERD
was created to address this type of discrimination when domestic law does not,
ICERD also has not been implemented in a way that reflects this. Damaging hate
speech has continued to take place in Japan, but Japan is reluctant to formalize
laws as stringent and effective as the UK’s hate speech laws exemplified above.
As the negative effects of this lack of regulation continue in Japan, however, the
need only increases for its laws to be reviewed.
B.

The Call for Hate Speech Laws

For decades in Japan, there have been calls for human rights legislation and
antidiscrimination protections. 111 In 2012 and recent years subsequent, the calls
have been in response to an increased incidence of anti-Korean rallies and

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id.
Shaun O’Dwyer, supra note 101.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Martin, supra note 9, at 460.
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demonstrations. 112 Given the tense history between Korea and Japan, these
demonstrations have caused significant pain and controversy. 113
There are currently “over half a million people in Japan who are of Korean
descent and who do not have Japanese nationality.” 114 The Koreans in Japan:
are mostly descendants of immigrants from Korea who were stripped of their
Japanese nationality after World War II. While they are third and fourth
generation descendants of those initially brought to Japan when Korea was part
of the Japanese Empire, and who were thus born and raised in Japan, they retain
North or South Korean nationality . . . [S]ome are effectively stateless as a
matter of international law, even though [they are] registered as being North
Korean under Japanese law. The internal dynamics of this community are
complex, and . . . [s]everal of the rallies against Korean-Japanese [people] were
videotaped and received considerable publicity. 115

One rally included a “young girl screaming that Koreans should be massacred,
among other things.” 116 “Several of the protests were held outside of KoreanJapanese schools, [subjecting] young children to abusive verbal attacks.” 117
While some laws and attempts at implementing ICERD resulted from this
discrimination against Koreans in Japan, some would argue that this type of
discrimination does not necessarily constitute racism. One scholar suggested
that “[b]ecause the large numbers of Koreans and Chinese who live in Japan are
racially indistinguishable from Japanese, the prejudicial attitude Japanese have
toward them is more a case of ethnic prejudice and discrimination, that is,
ethnocentrism, rather than racial prejudice.” 118 Thus, while Korean
discrimination in Japan falls under a very important category of hate speech
discrimination, it does not necessarily address forms of racial discrimination that
exist in Japan against people who do not look Japanese.

112. Id. at 460–61.
113. See South Korea and Japan’s Feud Explained, BBC (Dec. 2, 2019), https://www.bbc.com
/news/world-asia-49330531 [https://perma.cc/F9N8-SU6Z].
114. Martin, supra note 9, at 461.
115. Id. (citing Shigenori Matsui, The Challenge to Multiculturalism: Hate Speech Ban in
Japan, 49 UBC L. REV. 427, 443 (2016)).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Debito Arudou, Japan’s Under-Researched Visible Minorities: Applying Critical Race
Theory to Racialization Dynamics in a Non-White Society, 14 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV.
695, 702 (2015). Depending on one’s definition of race, Japan’s problems of discrimination against
Koreans present an interesting contrast to the United States in that Korean descendants can often
“pass” as Japanese ethnicity. In other words, it has often been noted by Japanese individuals that
discrimination towards Korean or Chinese individuals occurs when the foreigners to Japan begin
to speak, and less so when they see them visually. This would especially be true with KoreanJapanese descendants discussed above. In essence, this makes the visible and non-visible minority
distinction Arudou makes all the more important and informative.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

962

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 65:945

Although the analysis above accurately describes the root causes of
discrimination in Japan, it overlooks what happens at “‘Japanese Only’
establishments, where ‘foreigners’ have been excluded based on sightidentification alone.” 119 There are problems in Japan with what some scholars
have called “visible minorities.” 120 “Visible minority” is an established term that
was approved by the Canadian Government as an official legal status in 2009,
referring to people who belong to a visually identifiable group. 121 In the context
of minorities in Japan, it is defined as “residents of Japan who are visually
identified as not ‘looking Japanese’ . . . and are thus treated as ‘not
Japanese.’” 122 These groups include, but are not limited to, subcontinental
Indians, descendants of the African diaspora, non-Nikkei South Americans, and
some South Asians. 123 This distinction highlights some of the problem of
applying ICERD in Japan—who falls under the application and protections of
the treaty?
C. Implementation of ICERD in Japan
Without domestic laws that cover private acts of racial discrimination,
Japanese courts indirectly apply international treaties to fill the gap.124
International law, therefore, was what courts used to provide an interpretive
compass to draw boundaries of unacceptable conduct. 125
“Although not the first foreigner to sue for discrimination [in Japan], Ana
Bortz nevertheless put racial discrimination on the map in Japanese
jurisprudence” in Bortz v. Suzuki. 126 “In 1988, the Brazilian reporter was ordered
to leave a jewelry store in Hamamatsu, a city of more than half a million people
[a]fter the owner discovered that she was Brazilian, and not French as he had
assumed.” 127 The owner directed her attention towards a sign that said
“foreigners are strictly forbidden.” 128 Bortz took issue with the owner, store
employees, and local police, as well as summoning her colleagues from the
foreign media, in the hopes that the store owners would capitulate and recognize
that this behavior violated her human rights. 129 When the storeowners refused to
apologize, Bortz sued in what a scholar called a “fairly remarkable” decision
119. Id. at 703.
120. Id. at 701.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 701–02.
123. Arudou, supra note 118, at 702.
124. Timothy Webster, Reconstituting Japanese Law: International Norms and Domestic
Litigation, 30 MICH. J. INT’L L. 211, 217 (2008).
125. Id. at 218.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Webster, supra note 124, at 218.
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given that no law in Japan specifically prevented this type of behavior. 130 In
arriving at a conclusion, the court insisted that ICERD could fill the legislative
gap left by the Japanese government by stating:
If an act of racial discrimination violated a provision of ICERD, and the State or
organization did not take the measures that it should have, then one could, in
accordance with Article 6 of ICERD, at the very least seek compensation for
damages . . . due to the omission. 131

The judgement led to the largest damages award for racial discrimination to this
day with Bortz winning 1.5 million yen ($12,500 at the time) in damages. 132
While this case inspired other foreigners to avail themselves of the Japanese
government, and it was mostly a win in terms of ICERD’s implementation acting
as a “gap filler,” there were also problems with how ICERD was implemented.
The fact that Article 4 is not used as part of the case’s analysis is problematic.
The purpose of Article 4 is to directly address hate speech, but the decision in
this case does not specifically address the speech “foreigners are strictly
forbidden.” While this court’s conclusion is one of the first, and most favorable,
anti-discrimination decisions in Japan involving ICERD, it could have gone
further in describing what kind of speech is impermissible in Japan towards nonJapanese individuals. This case offered important, though not binding, precedent
for similarly aggrieved foreigners, but it did not effectively target hate speech in
a way that set precedent for the damaging words Japanese individuals and
businesses use towards non-Japanese people. 133
A case that exemplifies a more extreme and ineffective use of ICERD’s
Article 4 in Japan is McGowan v. Narita. In this case, African-American
designer Steve McGowan had lived in Japan for nearly a decade married to a
Japanese woman outside of Osaka. 134 In 2004, he stood outside of an eye glass
store with a South African friend admiring some frames, then suggested, “[t]hey
have even better ones inside” as McGowan had visited the store once in the
past. 135 Narita Takashi, the director of the store stepped out of the store and
unleashed a string of abusive language, screaming in Japanese “[g]et out of here.
I hate black people. Don’t touch the door. Don’t touch the window. You’re
bothering me. Impossible!” 136 Narita proceeded to wave the backs of both hands
as if driving away animals, which stunned McGowan. 137 “[W]hen McGowan
and his wife returned to the store to discuss the incident, Narita told them that

130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id.
Id. at 219.
Id.
Id.
Webster, supra note 124, at 226.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 226–27.
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he had ‘bad memories’ of black people” from prior experiences making him
“excited when he saw McGowan.” 138
Even more surprising was the fact that Osaka’s district court dismissed
McGowan’s claims due to “insufficient evidence” because McGowan could not
prove that he heard and experienced the verbal abuse. 139 The court focused “on
the fact that [McGowan] could not be sure whether he heard Narita claim that
he hated ‘black people’ (kokujin) or ‘foreigners’ (gaikokugin).” 140 From the
perspective of many foreigners, common people in Japan, and even scholars,
this was an odd distinction for the court to dwell on, as both terms would
constitute discrimination and likely racism in Japan. A Japanese man yelling at
an African American man that he hates foreigners/blacks would register as
racism in this context, regardless of which word was used. 141 Nevertheless, the
court found that McGowan was not good enough at Japanese to ascertain the
meaning of Narita’s utterances. 142
Fortunately, this decision was overturned on appeal in an unpublished
decision rendered in 2006. 143 While McGowan received a fraction of what Bortz
received above, the Osaka High Court awarded McGowan 350,000 yen
(approximately $3,000 at the time) in compensation. 144 Similar to the district
court, however, “the appellate court did not find that Narita had committed an
act of racial discrimination,” but found that “Narita’s acts exceeded ‘social
norms,’ which suffices to attach liability under Japanese tort law.” 145
While this case is considered a divergence from Japanese jurisprudence
regarding racism, it once again highlights how ICERD and international law are
failing to be implemented. 146 In this case, there was a high evidentiary burden
on the Plaintiff to prove that what he heard and experienced was
discriminatory. 147 The appellate court did not seem to even consider
international law doctrines regarding hate speech even though the words and
actions used against McGowen were arguably more forceful than what Bortz
experienced. For example, using the language of Article 4, this case involved
138. Id. at 227.
139. Webster, supra note 124, at 227.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. Interestingly, the act in and of itself of telling a foreigner who speaks fluent Japanese
that their “Japanese isn’t good enough” is another way Japanese people discriminate against
foreigners and other races in Japan. See Daisuke Kikuchi, Tackling Signs in Japan that You’re Not
Welcome, THE JAPAN TIMES (June 4, 2017), https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/06/04/na
tional/tackling-signs-japan-youre-not-welcome/#.XlAToRdKhQI
[https://perma.cc/XS8M-3T
ED].
143. Webster, supra note 124, at 227.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. See id.
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the promotion of ideas “based on ideas or theories of superiority of one race or
group of persons of one color or ethnic origin.” 148 There was an attempt by
Narita to “justify . . . racial hatred and discrimination” when he said he had just
had bad experiences with black people. 149 Additionally, ICERD claims that it
shall declare it a punishable offense by law, declare the promotion of these ideas
illegal while prohibiting the promotion of these racist ideas, and that it shall not
permit any institution to promote or incite racial discrimination. 150 This
language also directly applies to the earlier case as finding out a person is
Brazilian—and not French—then discriminating against them on that basis is a
direct violation of ICERD. Thus, Article 4 of ICERD would easily have been
applicable, but again, this application was overlooked.
IV. GERMANY
Germany and the United States are often compared as having two of the
most differing approaches to hate speech and free speech, making Germany an
ideal country to analyze regarding the effectiveness of ICERD, free speech, and
hate speech regulations. 151 What makes Germany interesting as a comparison to
the United States is that there are similar values for the freedom of speech in
Germany, but within those values, Germany and the United States differ in their
constitutional approach to hate speech. Germany, as compared to Japan, is
similarly fascinating. While the United States is a “melting pot” of people,
cultures, and ideas, Japan and Germany constitute two of the more homogenous
countries in the world. 152
A.

Free Speech in Germany

Germany’s central guiding authority on free speech comes from Article Five
of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany. Article Five is titled
“Freedom of Expression, Arts, and Sciences” and states:
(1) Every person shall have the right freely to express and disseminate his
opinions in speech, writing and pictures and to inform himself without hindrance
from generally accessible sources. Freedom of the press and freedom of
reporting by means of broadcasts and films shall be guaranteed. There shall be
no censorship. (2) These rights shall find their limits in the provisions of general
148. ICERD, supra note 11.
149. See id.
150. See id.
151. See Mila Versteeg, What Europe Can Teach America About Free Speech, THE ATLANTIC
(Aug. 19, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/08/what-europe-can-teachamerica-about-free-speech/537186/ [https://perma.cc/FKC3-7XWU].
152. See Max Fisher, A Revealing Map of the World’s Most and Least Ethnically Diverse
Countries, WASH. POST (May 16, 2013 at 11:33 a.m. CDT), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/news/worldviews/wp/2013/05/16/a-revealing-map-of-the-worlds-most-and-least-ethnicallydiverse-countries/ [https://perma.cc/4XVX-HCAY].
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laws, in provisions for the protection of young persons and in the right to
personal honour. (3) Arts and sciences, research and teaching shall be free. The
freedom of teaching shall not release any person from allegiance to the
constitution. 153

The German constitution’s free speech provisions, unlike the United States and
Japan, explicitly state that these rights have limits that will be found in general
laws and provisions within Germany. It also highlights a concern for young
people to be protected while citizens and residents of Germany practice free
speech. While Germany’s constitution incorporates free speech in a way that
bears some similarities to the United States and Japan, several scholars describe
Germany’s allowance of free speech as couched in subordination to human
dignity. 154 Human dignity stands at the heart of German constitutional law and
is framed in an absolute manner. 155 It has been framed as the heart of German
constitutional law because, similar to the United States’ First Amendment
suggesting the primacy of free speech by amending and implementing it first,
Article One of the German basic law states that “the dignity of man is inviolable”
and “[t]o respect and protect it is the duty of all state authority.” 156 One scholar
notes:
human dignity is at the top of the Basic Law’s value order. It is the formative
principle in terms of which all other constitutional values are defined and
explained. The omnipotence of human dignity in German constitutional law is
unparalleled, since human dignity is perceived as the root for all basic rights,
and all basic rights are considered specific manifestations of the human dignity
principle. 157

Human dignity has been framed as an “absolute” matter in Germany’s
constitution because human dignity has essentially been interpreted as referring
to the most fundamental of human rights, which should not be violated under
any circumstances. 158 Some scholars refer to human dignity as the “preferred
freedom” in German constitutional law, analogizing it again to the First
Amendment in the United States. 159 Article One of the Basic Law is equivalent
153. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW], art. 5, translation at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de
/englisch_gg/index.html [https://perma.cc/FQ6Z-DRKP].
154. See Guy E. Carmi, Dignity Versus Liberty: The Two Western Cultures of Free Speech, 26
B.U. INT’L L.J. 277, 326 (2008).
155. Id. at 324.
156. Id.
157. Id.; DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL
REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 359, 361 (2d ed. 1997); Dierk Ullrich, Concurring Visions: Human
Dignity in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the Basic Law of the Federal
Republic of Germany, 3 GLOBAL JURIST FRONTIERS 1, 82 (2003).
158. Carmi, supra note 154, at 324.
159. Id. at 324–325; Ronald J. Krotoszynski Jr., A Comparative Perspective on the First
Amendment: Free Speech, Militant Democracy, and the Primacy of Dignity as a Preferred
Constitutional Value in Germany, 78 TUL. L. REV. 1549, 1577 (2004).
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to the First Amendment in that human dignity occupies the position that liberty
is said to play in the American constitutional order. 160 In those countries that
value human dignity above individual liberty, dignity is in significant tension
with liberty and freedom of expression. 161 Article Five of the Basic Law is the
free speech clause, but when compared to Article One, the primacy of the latter
is evident. 162
Elements of dignity and personal honor serve as both external and internal
limitations on freedom of expression. The robust human dignity clause affects
the interpretation of Article 5, but Article 5 itself specifically mentions the right
for personal honor, among other things, as a limitation on free speech. This legal
approach reflects a deep-seated cultural fact that personal honor [and dignity
are] simply more important to Germans than free speech. 163

As with the United States, Japan, and most countries in the world, there is a
reason Germany’s constitution favors human dignity over free speech—its own
history.
B.

Germany’s History and Resulting Hate Speech Laws

Since the United States and Germany fall on opposite ends of the spectrum,
they continue to be a helpful, illustrative comparison. The two countries have
not only differing free speech and hate speech laws, but also starkly different
histories that have led them to develop their own legal systems. For example,
the United States started a war to gain independence, while Germany started
World War II. 164 These two histories have vastly “influenced the values of the
respective countries, which in turn has affected their respective laws, especially
for hate speech regulation.” 165
Germany’s hate speech laws can mostly be attributed to World War II and
the Holocaust. 166 Speech was generally restricted during World War II, and
freedom of speech essentially did not exist. 167 While most scholars agree with
this attribution, the argument has also been made that the origins of hate speech
laws date back to the Middle Ages. 168 Nonetheless, “[t]he legal reconstruction
of Germany following the Holocaust included numerous measures specifically
intended to eradicate the ideolog[ies] of Nazism and the racial prejudice
160. Carmi, supra note 154, at 325; KOMMERS, supra note 157, at 359.
161. Carmi, supra note 154, at 325; KOMMERS, supra note 157, at 359.
162. Carmi, supra note 154, at 325–326.
163. Id. at 326; Krotoszynski, supra note 159, at 1607.
164. Levine, supra note 1, at 1305. The reality of black slavery is another horrible part of United
States history that some argue should influence the United States in the same way as the Holocaust
and World War II have affected Germany.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 1317.
167. Id. at 1317–18.
168. Id. at 1318; See Carmi, supra note 154, at 327.
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underlying the Holocaust.” 169 Unlike provisions in the United States focused on
individual freedom that allocate equal protection through the law, freedom of
religion, and the right to vote, the German constitution contains more communal
provisions “aimed at disbanding the Nazi party, preventing the rise of any
similar organization, and removing Nazi ideology and rhetoric from public
discourse.” 170 For example, the German government “may ban political parties
and associations that threaten the ‘free democratic basic order’ and . . . may limit
the exercise of individual rights by any citizen whose conduct threatens the
stability of the state or infringes on the rights of others.” 171 Unlike Japan,
Germany’s laws strongly and clearly reflect that they are willing to follow
through on their protections against racism through legal enforcement. Acts
classified as “attacks on human dignity,” “incitement to race hatred,” and
propagating the “Auschwitz lie” (a Nazi concentration camp) are classified as
serious offenses and carry stiff penalties. 172
The German Penal Code includes language that specifies acts of hate speech
that are illegal. 173 For example, Section 130 of the German Criminal Code
covers inciting hatred stating:
(1) Whoever, in a manner which is suitable for causing a disturbance of the
public peace,
1. incites hatred against a national, racial, religious group or a group defined
by their ethnic origin, against sections of the population or individuals on
account of their belonging to one of the aforementioned groups or sections
of the population, or calls for violent or arbitrary measures against them or
2. violates the human dignity of others by insulting, maliciously maligning
or defaming one of the aforementioned groups, sections of the population
or individuals on account of their belonging to one of the aforementioned
groups or sections of the population
incurs a penalty of imprisonment for a term of between three months and five
years. 174

169. Natasha L. Minsker, “I Have a Dream—Never Forget”: When Rhetoric Becomes Law, A
Comparison of the Jurisprudence of Race in Germany and the United States, 14 HARV.
BLACKLETTER L.J. 113, 137 (1998).
170. Id. at 137–138.
171. Id. at 138.
172. Id. Additionally, the “Auschwitz lie” refers to contemporary attempts to deny the historical
truth of the Holocaust. Herbert A. Strauss, et al., On the “Auschwitz Lie”, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1026,
1026 (1989).
173. Levine, supra note 1, at 1319.
174. STRAFGESETZBUCH [StGB] [PENAL CODE], § 130, https://www.gesetze-iminternet.de
/englisch_stgb/englisch_stgb.html#p0877 [https://perma.cc/7D42-GVZ8]. The statute continues:
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In contrast to the criticisms of Japan’s laws not having specific
consequences attached to them, here, Germany has attached a specific range of
sentences to their penal code, formalizing appropriate sentencing with respect to
certain actions. Internationally, along with several countries in Europe that
enforce similar laws, the specificity and willingness to enforce laws against hate
speech has given Germany a positive reputation among those fighting for more
regulation of hate speech in countries that are more protective of all forms of
speech like the United States.

1. with respect to written materials (section 11(3)) which incite hatred against
an aforementioned group, segments of the population or individuals because of
their belonging to one of the aforementioned groups or segments of the
population which call for violent or arbitrary measures against them, or which
assault their human dignity by insulting, maliciously maligning or defaming
them,
(a) disseminates such written materials;
(b) publicly displays, posts, presents, or otherwise makes them accessible;
(c) offers, supplies or makes them accessible to a person under eighteen years;
or
(d) produces, obtains, supplies, stocks, offers, announces, commends,
undertakes to import or export them, in order to use them or copies obtained
from them within the meaning of Nos (a) to (c) facilitate such use by another; or
2. disseminates a presentation of the content indicated in No 1 above by radio,
media services, or telecommunication services Shall be liable to imprisonment
not exceeding three years or a fine.
(3) Whosoever publicly or in a meeting approves of, denies or downplays an act
committed under the rule of National Socialism of the kind indicated in section
6(1) of the Code of the International Criminal Law, in a manner capable of
disturbing the public peace shall be liable to imprisonment not exceeding five
years or a fine.
(4) Whosoever publicly or in a meeting disturbs the public peace in a manner
that violates the dignity of the victims by approving of, glorifying, or justifying
National Socialist rule of arbitrary force shall be liable to imprisonment not
exceeding three years or a fine.
(5) Subsection (2) above shall also apply to written materials (section 11(3)) of
a content such as is indicated in subsections (3) and (4) above.
(6) In cases under subsection (2) above, also in conjunction with subsection (5)
above, and in cases of subsections (3) and (4) above, section 86(3) shall apply
mutatis mutandis.
Id.
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C. Implementation of ICERD in Germany
While there is a broad international consensus that governments must defend
freedom of expression against suppression as a fundamental human right, these
sentiments are limited by an equally broad international consensus that this
speech does not include the most degrading and threatening forms of racist
speech. 175 Some claim that this value is documented by Article 4 of ICERD. 176
Germany, however, has already implemented these values into their legal
system. Thus, regarding ICERD’s regulation of hate speech, how much has
ICERD been needed when Germany’s domestic laws have addressed the
purpose behind the formation of Article 4?
One of the problems Germany faces is that their laws against hate crime are
so thorough. As a result, when ICERD is sought to be implemented after the
German Penal Code fails to convict, ICERD is likely to categorize German
domestic law as “sufficient” to have convicted the crime correctly. Therefore, if
an individual uses hate speech and the German court decides not to convict them
under domestic German law, the individual is also unlikely to be convicted under
ICERD due to Germany’s robust laws. A good example of this is TBB-Turkish
Union in Berlin/Bradenburg v. Germany. In this case,
[t]he German cultural journal Lettre International published an interview with
Mr. Thilo Sarrazin, the former finance Senator of the Berlin Senate and member
of the Board of Directors of the German Central Bank, entitled ‘Class instead of
Mass: from the Capital City of Social Services to the Metropolis of the Elite.’ 177

During this interview, “Mr. Sarrazin expressed himself in a derogatory and
discriminatory way about social ‘lower classes,’ which are ‘not productive’ and
would have to ‘disappear over time’ in order to create a city of the ‘elite.’” 178 In
this context, he stated in part:
The city has a productive circulation of people, who work and who are needed
. . . Beside them, there is a number of people, about 20% of the population, who
are economically not needed. They live off social welfare . . . and transfer
income; on a federal level this segment is only 8-10%. This part of the
population needs to disappear over time. A large number of Arabs and Turks in
this city . . . have no productive function, except for the fruit and vegetable trade
...
There is another problem: the lower the class, the higher the birth rate. The birth
rates of the Arabs and Turks are two to three times higher than what corresponds
175. Friedrich Kubler, How Much Freedom for Racist Speech?: Transnational Aspects of a
Conflict of Human Rights, 27 HOFSTRA L. REV. 335, 356 (1998).
176. Id.
177. U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Communication No. 48/2010:
Opinion, 4 Apr. 2013, CERD/2/82/D/48/2010, https://www2.ohchr.org/English/bodies/cerd/docs
/CERD-C-82-D-48-2010-English.pdf [https://perma.cc/K2CW-96SF] [hereinafter Opinion].
178. Id. at ¶ 2.1.
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to their overall part in the population. Large segments are neither willing nor
able to integrate. The solution to this problem can only be to stop letting people
in and whoever wants to get married, should do it abroad . . . My idea would be
to generally prohibit influx, except for highly qualified individuals and not
provide social welfare for immigrants anymore.
. . . I don’t have to accept anyone who doesn’t do anything. I don’t have to accept
anyone who lives off the state and rejects this very state, who doesn’t make an
effort to reasonably educate their children and constantly produces new little
headscarf girls. That is true for 70% of the Turkish and for 90% of the Arab
population in Berlin. Many of them don’t want any integration, they want to live
according to their own rules. Furthermore, they encourage a collective mentality
that is aggressive and ancestral . . .
. . . The Turks are conquering Germany just like the Kosovars conquered
Kosovo: through a higher birth rate. I wouldn’t mind if they were East European
Jews with about a 15% higher IQ than the one of Germans. 179

As this commentary was quite offensive, the Turkish Union “‘as the interest
group of the Turkish citizens and citizens with Turkish heritage of Berlin and
Brandenburg’ filed a complaint of criminal offense against Mr. Sarrazin to the
Office of Public Prosecution.” 180 It claimed:
that Mr. Sarrazin’s statements constituted incitement of the people, pursuant to
article 130 of the Criminal Code, in particular because ‘Turks and Arabs were
presented as inferior and denied a right to existence in our society.’ Mr. Sarrzin’s
statements were reviewed with respect to article 130 . . . of the German Criminal
Code, [but] the Office of Public Prosecution established that there was no
criminal liability for Mr. Sarrazin’s statements and terminated the proceedings.
The Office . . . based its decision on article 5 of the Basic Law (freedom of
expression) and concluded that incitement to hatred against a segment of the
population versus an individual was not recognized and that Mr. Sarrazin’s
statements are considered as a ‘contribution to the intellectual debate in a
question that [was] very significant for the public.’” 181

After domestic remedies had been exhausted, the Turkish Union claimed to
be violated and victimized by Germany and, among other Articles, claimed that
Article 4, paragraph (a) of ICERD should be applied to their case because
Germany, a state party to ICERD, “failed to provide protection under its
Criminal Code against Mr. Sarrazin’s racially discriminatory and insulting
statements directed against . . . individuals of Turkish heritage.” 182 This
complaint was also rejected, however, for multiple reasons. The court first found
that Mr. Sarrazin’s statements, though polemic, “did not call for particular

179.
180.
181.
182.

Id.
Id. at ¶ 2.2.
Id. at ¶ 2.3.
Opinion, supra note 177, at ¶¶ 2.6, 3.1.
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actions like violence or arbitrary measures.” 183 Germany also maintained that
“the decisions by the criminal prosecution authorities were in conformity with
article 4 (a) of the Convention.” 184 “As a consequence of the interview, there
were several complaints from organisations and individuals of different
nationalities, [but] the authorities concluded that considering the context,
purpose, and content of the statements, an offence of incitement to racial or
ethnic hatred could not be established.” 185 Furthermore, it noted that Mr.
Sarrazin expressed his own personal views and did not attempt to represent any
official or semi-official views. 186 It went on to say “[t]here was no indication
that Mr. Sarrazin intended to incite hatred against certain segments of the
population,” and “[h]is statement was neither objectively suitable nor
subjectively determined to strengthen an emotionally increased hostile attitude
against people of Turkish or Arab origin.” 187 As a result, the Turkish Union did
not find a remedy through ICERD Article 4. 188
An interesting aspect of this case is that ICERD’s implementation did not
come out of a gap in legislative remedies in Germany. It came out of the fact
that Germany had so many laws and regulations addressing hate speech, that the
decision came down questioning why ICERD was necessary since German laws
were already so robust. While the case illustrates some positive outcomes in
terms of seeing domestic law against hate speech implemented, it also presents
a problem that prompts an important question: what if the given country has
made the wrong decision in the midst of robust legislation? Here, a tribunal
applying ICERD objectives could have concluded that Article 4 of ICERD was
violated because racist and discriminatory sentiments were—at the very least—
183. Id. at ¶ 4.4.
184. Id. at ¶ 4.5.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Opinion, supra note 177, at ¶ 4.5. The case goes on to say, “Hatred based on intolerance
was not incited, promoted or justified. There were a lot of critical reactions to Mr. Sarrazin’s
statements and many people living in Germany stated in public that they did not share his point of
view. In August 2010, Mr. Sarrazin published his book ‘Germany is [sic] self-destructing,” which
included similar statements. Many important personalities took public positions against the views
put forward in the book. Chancellor Angela Merkel called Mr. Sarrazin’s statements ‘stupid’ and
the Social democratic Party, to which Mr. Sarrazin belongs, initiated a procedure for exclusion
from the Party. This discussion showed that a majority of the German population did not share the
opinion of Mr. Sarrazin and it is not true that a main part of the society was encouraged and
confirmed in their latent racism because of the interview and the decisions to terminate the criminal
investigations. The State party submits that there was no increased risk for the petitioner or its
members to become victims of future criminal acts. Rather, as a consequence of the interview, the
discussion on how to improve the situation of immigrants and how to promote their integration has
gained welcome prominence.” Id. Thus, both the fact that Germany’s leaders and people were able
to speak against these sentiments, along with inciting violence towards a certain group of people,
were very important factors in this decision.
188. Id.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2021]

THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION

973

presented in a public sphere, thus publicly promoting negative ideas about Arabs
and Turks.
Additionally, Article 4(a) was indeed violated. While the case above claims
the ideas were the personal views of the speaker, thus labelled not harmful,
Article 4(a) does not rule this type of harm out. Article 4(a) states that all
dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred shall be declared
punishable. 189 The language used by Mr. Sarrazin above easily falls into this
category. While ICERD mentions violence, violence does not need to be directly
involved in the speech for ICERD to apply. Thus, in this case, ICERD failed to
be properly implemented.
V. A PROPOSAL ON HOW TO BETTER IMPLEMENT ICERD IN HATE SPEECH
CASES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD
A.

Comparing the United States, Japan, and Germany

From a comparative, analytical perspective, the United States sits on one
end of the spectrum in which free speech holds primacy over, what some would
argue, human dignity because of the lack of hate speech regulation. While some
Americans have called for change in this area, compared to other countries, the
movement to regulate speech at all is both slow and unpopular.
Japan falls into a category not nearly as extreme as the United States. While
Japan has valued free speech as prime in the past, recently, as they witness the
damage it is causing the United States and deal with lawsuits involving racism
and discrimination themselves, they have hesitated to associate themselves with
the United States’ “all speech should be protected” sentiments.
Finally, in relation to the United States, Germany falls on the opposite end
of the spectrum by valuing human dignity and honor over freedom of speech.
With extensive and intentional laws regulating hate speech, Germany has shown
their concern not to repeat their own horrific history, favoring instead to protect
vulnerable groups from the damages of hate speech. One would think that the
United States’ history with slavery and genocide would lead to the same
conclusions as Germany, but it has not.
In light of this, the way that ICERD has failed to be implemented is
somewhat different in each country but bears similarities in terms of what
solutions could look like.
B.

How ICERD Can Change for Better Implementation

From an assessment of these three countries, while ICERD Article 4 has
provided some relief against hate speech, it largely has not consistently
accomplished its purpose when it comes to implementation. The language in the

189. ICERD, supra note 11.
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treaty illustrates a desire to stop racial discrimination through hate speech, but
the language also needs more specificity to be effective.
First, ICERD Article 4 needs specific language to ensure that if the treaty is
violated, certain consequences will be applied to the situation. For example,
Article 4(a) states, “[State parties] [s]hall declare an offence punishable by law
all dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred, incitement to
racial discrimination, as well as all acts of violence or incitement to such acts
against any race or group of persons . . .” 190 But the treaty does not go far enough
to explain how an offense will be punishable by law once the treaty is violated.
Who is responsible for deciding the sentence? Under what circumstances does
the offence become punishable by law? Specifying these things would be
incredibly helpful in implementing ICERD more effectively across the board.
The two cases discussed from Japan above support this analysis. In Bortz v.
Suzuki, ICERD’s implementation in the midst of the Japanese legislative gap
was a positive choice on the part of the Japanese judiciary, but it also presents a
problem in that it leaves to the discretion of the court when they think that
legislative gap needs to be filled. Thus, it results in cases like McGowan v.
Narita where the victim of hate speech experienced something arguably more
racially targeted and offensive, and the court decided that he didn’t experience
any discriminatory speech. A common sense reading of ICERD Article 4 would
almost definitely place McGowan in a category of experiencing the
discrimination described in Article 4. But because ICERD was used as a nonbinding gap filler, the court decided differently and brought charges against the
defendant through Japanese laws on “social norms.” In terms of suggested
language that could be added to ICERD to promote proper implementation, it
could specify, “When a country decides to use ICERD as a gap filler for lack of
legislation regarding hate speech in the state party, hate speech should be
analyzed and defined as . . .” If one reads Article 4, the definition of hate speech
can be extracted as “speech targeted at promoting or justifying the racial hatred
or discrimination of a person or group based on their color or ethnic origin that
incites racial discrimination and has the possibility of inciting violence against
such a group based on their color or ethnic origin.” 191 A provision could also be
included for when a party appeals using ICERD when domestic law does not
supply the desired remedy, as in the German case. Consequently, it would
increase the efficiency and effectiveness of ICERD if common problems with
implementation that result in hate speech acquittals are analyzed and then
applied to the language of Article 4.
Second, each state that is a party to ICERD should evaluate their laws on
hate speech and assess how their laws are hindering effective implementation of
Article 4. Parties to ICERD have a responsibility to assess how their domestic
190. Id.
191. Id.
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laws interfere with or impact agreements they have made with other state parties.
The issue of ICERD’s language is relevant here because there is not much
direction in Article 4 for how to assess whether the application of domestic law
is accurate when ICERD Article 4 is cited as the basis for appeal.
For example, the case above with Germany provides an example of how
domestic law creates some confusion about how ICERD should be applied when
an appeal is brought. Germany has some of the best, most effective legislation
in the world when it comes to hate speech laws. But the case above exemplifies
how Germany’s values are reflected in their laws, making other instances of hate
speech that may not violate their specific values fail to be convicted when they
very well may have violated international law norms codified through ICERD.
A solution would be for countries like Germany to compare their laws’ values
with the values codified in ICERD Article 4 and ask questions about what is
different, what is missing, and how their laws can also catch what would be
considered an international violation. The same holds true for a country like the
United States.
CONCLUSION
ICERD is a necessary treaty that was created in response to problems of
discrimination being faced by vulnerable, marginalized communities in multiple
countries. It has been useful and needs to be supplemented rather than
eliminated. It is apparent that implementation of Article 4 has, at the very least,
not corresponded with the original goals intended by the UN. However, if the
language of the treaty is changed to specify how and when ICERD will be
triggered to bring violators to conviction, this will increase effectiveness and
hate speech discrimination cases will correctly be convicted more often.
Additionally, state parties must commit to assessing their own free speech and
hate speech laws to foster a legal system in which ICERD is most likely to thrive.
While Germany is the most progressive of the three countries discussed in this
article in regard to hate speech regulation, all three countries must put more
effort into assuring that domestic legislation will—as the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties instructs on the interpretation of treaties—reflect the
“ordinary meaning . . . of the treaty” in this context in light of the “object and
purpose” originally intended for ICERD. 192
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